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UNREVIEW ABILITY IN STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LA W1 
By: Charles H. Koch, Jr. 2 
Unreviewability doctrine is not often important in either federal 
or state administrative law but, when it is important, it is very, very 
important. It determines whether an agency decision will receive any 
judicial scrutiny at all. Therefore, it raises a threshold question for each 
challenge to agency action. It establishes ultimate agency power and 
defines judicial authority over certain administrative programs. 
A. Three Categories ofUnreviewability 
The Federal APA, Section 701(a), defines the type of 
administrative action for which review is precluded. Section 701(a)(l) 
provides for statutory preclusion. Section 701(a)(2) provides that 
agency decisions are reviewable "except to the extent that-(2) agency 
action is committed to agency discretion by law." This section has been 
held to preclude review where the delegation of authority to the agency 
is so complete as to leave no role for a court. 
From this is usually derived two categories of review 
preclusion. First, a statute may preclude review of either an entire 
category of administrative decisions or specific aspects of certain 
administrative decisions. Statutory preclusion is very closely 
circumscribed. Second, an administrative scheme may provide no basis 
on which to evaluate an agency's resolution and hence implies such 
complete administrative authority and decision making freedom, 
"discretion," that the courts are not left any role.3 
1Derived from 3 Koch, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, 2d §§ 13.1-13.6 
(1997). 
2Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
3The term "discretion" pervades administrative law even more than other legal 
disciplines. Yet, it is one of the most unsatisfactory phrases in law. Discretion has many 
meanings, especially in application. In judicial review, for example, the existence of 
"discretion" may mean that the decision is unreviewable or reviewable only for abuse. The core 
meaning of the term discretion is some degree of decision making freedom and independence. 
59 
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As will be discussed below, these two categories do not 
satisfactorily include all the administrative decisions the courts have 
found unreviewable. Another look at 701(a)(2)suggests an additional 
category that cover these cases. The term "by law" might be said to 
instruct a court to infer unreviewability from "law" other than a 
statutory delegation. That is, some doctrine, other than compliance 
with a statute, may dictate that courts have no function with respect to 
the controverted issues. A third category emerges in which the agency 
acquires complete administrative authority and decision making 
freedom by the operation of law, either judge-made common law or an 
interpretation of constitutional doctrine. This category then adds to the 
notion of "unreviewable discretion."4 
These three categories organize state, as well federal, 
unreviewability doctrine. Even in the absence of statutory language like 
that in Section 701(a) of the Federal APA, state law can be found to 
establish all three forms of review preclusion.5 A statute may preclude 
review or a statute may delegate such complete authority, discretion, 
that review is necessarily precluded. In addition, other legal principles 
embodied in state law may dictate against review. 
B. Confining the Operation of Unreviewability 
Unreviewability doctrine is always guided by the principle that, 
although unreviewability is recognized, it is not preferred.6 In state as 
The degree of such decision making freedom and independence in the particular context 
emerges as a crucial question. Here, the decision making freedom must be found to be so 
complete that the courts may not perform a monitoring function. 
4Some urge that all such decisions are reviewable for abuse. However, review for 
abuse is review and injects the courts into the decision making process in violation of the law 
discussed here. 
~Neither the 1961 nor the 1981 version of the model state APA deal with 
unreviewability. A Westlaw search using a variety of search terms did not uncover such 
language in state AP As. 
&rhe federal APA expressly recognizes unreviewability in 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a) but very 
few decisions of federal agencies are unreviewable. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
reaffirmed the presumption in favor of reviewability. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 
498 U.S. 479, Ill S.Ct. 888, ll2 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of 
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 2135, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). William 
Eskridge, however, observed that the "presumption of reviewability is not as robust as it once 
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well as federal law, the general principle is that: "All final 
administrative actions are presumptively reviewable. "7 In both state 
and federal law, only clear command may overturn this presumption.8 
In addition to this presumption, wrreviewability is often further 
confined to specific issues so that other issues in a decision might be 
reviewable. Each administrative decision involves the resolution of a 
bundle of issues and only certain categories of issues within that bundle 
might be made wrreviewable.9 If the entire decision is made 
unreviewable or the controverted issues all fall into one of the 
categories discussed below, then the entire decision is unreviewable. 
In many cases, however, only some of the controverted issues are 
wrreviewable and the decision is still reviewable as to the remainder of 
the controverted issues. 10 On the other hand, a court cannot create 
review authority by artificially carving out reviewable issues.'' 
Review of constitutional questions may be precluded by 
expressed language only. The Supreme Court in Webster v. Doe 
reaffirmed the general concept that constitutional questions may be 
made wrreviewable but added that Congress must make such intentions 
clear.'2 "[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of 
constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear." 13 The Court 
was." William Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Politics of Public Choice Theory for 
Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va.L.Rev. 275, 331 n.l53 (1988). 
7E.g., Usibelli Coal Mine Inc. v. State, 921 P.2d 1134, 1150 (Alaska 1996). 
8Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E. 2d 251,254 (Ill. 1996). 
9ContrastJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,94 S.Ct. 1160,39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974) 
(The constitutional issues were not unreviewable even though other parts of the administrative 
decision were made unreviewable by statute.) with Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614, 104 
S.Ct. 2013, 2021, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (Any claim "inextricably intertwined" with an 
unreviewable claim will also be unreviewable.). 
10E.g., Scarabin v. DEA, 919 F.2d 337,338 (5th Cir.l990), rehearing denied 925 
F.2d 100 (5th Cir.l991); Marble Mountain Audubon Soc. v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 181-182 (9th 
Cir.1990); see, McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, Ill S.Ct. 888, 112 
L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991). 
11Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. v. Pena, 37 F.3d 671,675 (D.C.Cir.l994). 
12Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,601, 108 S.Ct. 2047,2053, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), 
on remand 859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Following the law made as to statutory preclusion, 
5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(1), in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 
(1974)). 
13486 U.S. at 601. 
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reaffirmed that holding in Lincoln v. Vigil. 14 
C. Review Precluded by Statute 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress power to 
create lower federal courts and thereby is generally interpreted as 
granting plenary legislative authority to define the jurisdiction of those 
courts. An act then may preclude review of specific agency action. 15 
This principle has been established in state law as well. One 
exception is Illinois where its Supreme Court has gone so far as to limit 
its legislature's power to preclude review because it found that any 
preclusion that infringed on the judiciary's "inherent powers" violated 
separation of powers principles. 16 Nonetheless, state legislatures are 
generally found empowered to preclude judicial review of some agency 
determinations. 17 
The extent of review preclusion in the states may be very 
limited. A Westlaw search using a variety of search terms uncovered no 
state AP A provisions recognizing statutory unreviewability. In addition, 
that search found very few state statutory provisions explicitly 
precluding review of administrative decisions. In the absence of explicit 
language, however, state courts as well as federal courts, on occasion, 
find review preclusion in less direct statutory language. 
The key question is how clear the intent to preclude must be. 
The U.S. Supreme Court consistently limits this authority. It has 
continually reiterated the general principle that review may only be 
precluded by "clear and convincing evidence" oflegislative intent to do 
14Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 2033, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 
(1993), on remand 2 F.3d 1161 (lOth Cir.l993). 
15E.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 
29 (1994). 
16Ardt v. Illinois Dept. of Professional Regulation, 607 N.E.2d 1226, 1231-1232 
(1992). 
17See New York City Department of Environmental Protection v. New York City 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 78 N.Y.2d 318, 574 N.Y.S.2d 664, 579 N.E.2d 1385 (1991) (Review of 
personnel decisions precluded.). 
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so. 18 The classic Abbott Laboratories opinion suggested to some that 
review preclusion must be found within the statutory language itself. 19 
In general, the Court has not limited itself to the statutory language but 
has attempted to discover legislative intent where the language is not 
clear. It has looked beyond the words of the statute to legislative history 
and even the nature of the administrative scheme.20 State courts can be 
expected to do likewise. 
The Virginia Supreme Court, for example, was not reluctant to 
find review preclusion from the statutory scheme. The opinion of the 
Virginia Supreme Court in the Virginia Beach case took a decidedly 
formalistic approach.21 A not-for-profit conservation group sought to 
challenge a zoning board decision granting a variance which allowed 
a hotel to erect a neon sign. The Court held that the organization did not 
have "standing" under the state AP A to challenge the decision because 
it found that statute precluded challenges by such groups. 
The Virginia Courts approach is reminiscent U.S. Court's 
approach in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute.22 There, consumers 
sought to challenge a milk "market order" but the Court found that the 
statute limited challenges to producers and wholesale marketers of milk 
products. The Court analyzed this case as a reviewability question, 
relying on the federal APA § 701(a)(l), even though it confronted a 
standing like question in that, while such agency decisions were 
reviewable, they were not reviewable through an action by these 
18Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 64, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2499, 
(1993)(Citing a long line of authority). 
19Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511 (1967). 
2
°For example, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, it said: 
"Whether and to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is 
determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the 
statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the 
administrative action involved." Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 
340, 345, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 2453, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). 
21Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City 
of Virginia Beach, 344 S.E.2d 899 ( 1986). 
22Biock v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340, 345-346, 104 S.Ct. 2450, 
2453-2454, 81 L.Ed.2d 270 (1984). 
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litigants. 
While the Virginia Court's result was the same, unlike the U.S. 
Court in Block, the Virginia Court confined itself to the statutory 
language. 23 It found that since the statute provided for actions by 
"aggrieved" parties only, an action by those without a legal interest was 
not reviewable. 24 Since the organization owned no real estate and 
indeed had no commercial interest, it could not be a party aggrieved 
within this statutory language. Unfortunately, Virginia has no 
legislative history for the Court to consult had it been disposed to do so. 
However, a fair reading of the statute and consideration of the intent of 
statutory scheme should have driven the Virginia Court to conclude that 
review was not so limited. Indeed, the Virginia AP A was designed to 
subject agencies to judicial scrutiny and organize, rather than block, 
challenges. 
The breadth of the search for legislative intent will, of course, 
cut both ways and lead to a finding against an effort to preclude review. 
In Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 25 the Supreme 
Court found that the statute did not preclude review. Although it 
started with the statutory language, it looked at the administrative 
scheme and the legislative history before concluding that review was 
not precluded. The Supreme Court has also found that silence about the 
type of review available will not establish the intent to preclude 
review.26 
Even if the statute precludes some review, the review preclusion 
should be confined to the extent consistent with the best administration 
of the particular program. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
231t should be noted also that the Virginia Court saw the issue as "standing," and 
Block could also be so classified, showing the interrelationship between reviewability and 
fundamental "justiciability" principles, such as standing (who may seek review), ripeness 
(when may they do so) and political question (scope of"judicial power"). 
24344 S.E.2d at, 902-903. 
25Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 
90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). 
26Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56-57, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2495, 
125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), on remand 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir.l993). 
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1986 expressly precluded review of INS denials of special status except 
in the context of a deportation order.27 The Supreme Court, in McNary 
v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., determined that review was permissible 
in a class action alleging that the agency's procedures violated the Act 
and the due process clause. 28 The Court found that Congress intended 
to preclude review for individual denials only.29 It seemed to require 
very explicit congressional language for those situations where the 
intent is to preclude "generic constitutional and statutory claims. "30 
Thus, review of general policy or agency practice is not precluded by 
statutory language precluding review of individual decisions.31 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in McNary, disagreed that Congress had 
not intended to preclude this type of review. He read the statute as 
providing very limited review and thereby "Congress intended to 
foreclose all other avenues of relief. "32 
D. Unreviewable Discretion Created by the Absence of 
a Meaningful Basis for Review 
A statute might give total authority to the administrative 
decision maker so as to leave no role for the courts. That is, the statute 
may not expressly preclude review as discussed above but may delegate 
so much authority to the agency that there is none left for the courts. 
Such a grant is said to create "unreviewable discretion." Unreviewable 
discretion exists when the decision maker is to have complete authority 
and not share its authority with the courts.33 
27100 Stat. 3359. 
2
'McNruy v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 111 S.Ct. 888, 112 L.Ed.2d 
1005 (1991). 
29498 U.S. at 492, Ill S.Ct. at 896. 
30498 U.S. at 493-499, 111 S.Ct. at 897-899. 
31Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 56, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 2495, 125 
L.Ed.2d 38 (1993), on remand 996 F.2d 221 (9th Cir.1993) (Reaffirming the decision in 
McNary.). 
32498 U.S. at 501, Ill S.Ct. at 901. 
33E.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994), 
rehearing denied 512 U.S. 1247, 114 S.Ct. 2771, 129 L.Ed.2d 884 (1994). All nine justices, 
in one way or another, agreed that base closing decisions under the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990 were committed to the President's unreviewable discretion. 
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In the search for unreviewable discretion, however, it must be 
remembered that the mere fact that the statute grants "discretion" does 
not necessarily make the agency's action unreviewable.34 The term 
"discretion" has several meanings involving a range of administrative 
authority and decision making freedom. Sometimes courts must 
recognize that the agency's authority and decision making freedom is 
so complete that they have no function in that particular decision. 
Usually, however, an administrative exercise of discretion may be 
reviewed. The federal AP A recognizes reviewable discretion as well as 
unreviewable discretion and provides in § 706 for review of certain 
types of discretion for "abuse". 
1. No meaningful standards 
The existence of unreviewable discretion often derives from the 
absence of standards by which a court may evaluate the agency 
decision. The Overton Park opinion is the seminal case recognizing 
this basis for unreviewable discretion. There, the Supreme Court found 
that unreviewable "absolute discretion" exists when the statute left the 
courts "no law to apply. "35 That is, a court should not attempt to review 
where the statute lacks meaningful standards whereby a reviewing court 
might evaluate the agency's exercise of discretion. The theory is that 
since Congress provided no basis upon which courts can evaluate the 
agency resolution it intended no role for the courts. 
The Overton Park test established a fairly straightforward and 
often cited test for determining whether Congress had so committed the 
decision to the agency's authority as to preclude review. Federal courts 
frequently apply that test in order to determine unreviewability.36 
34Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir.1994). 
3sCitizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413, 91 S.Ct. 814, 
822, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), on remand 335 F.Supp. 873 (W.D.Tenn.1972), opinion 
supplemented 357 F.Supp. 846 (W.D.Tenn.1973), order reversed 494 F.2d 1212 (6th 
Cir.1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 991,95 S.Ct. 1997,44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975). 
36Padavan v. U.S., 82 F.3d 23,29 {2d Cir. 1996); Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 
787, 789 (6th Cir.1991), rehearing denied 961 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.l992) (Army decision to 
privatize food services); Scalise v. Thornburgh, 891 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied 
494 U.S. 1083, 110 S.Ct. 1815, 108 L.Ed.2d 945 (1990) (international prisoner transfers); 
Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.1994) (FAA suspension of pilot examiner 
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State courts are also likely to judge whether a delegation is so 
complete as to preclude review by searching for meaningful standards. 
In Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, for example, the 
state agency asserted that it had exercised unreviewable discretion. 37 
Neighborhood residents challenged a decision by a housing authority 
to fund a proposed low income housing project in their area. The state 
housing authority asserted that the act committed decisions about its 
projects to its "sole discretion." The Illinois Supreme Court applied the 
Overton Park "no law to apply" test to determine whether the agency's 
discretion was indeed so complete as to preclude review. It found 
meaningful standards whereby it could evaluate the decision and that 
the standards were "mandatory."38 It therefore concluded that "[The 
agency's] decision ... is obviously entitled to great de(erence. But this 
deference is best assured by subjecting that decision only to review to 
determine whether it is arbitrary or capricious and not by insulating it 
from judicial review altogether."39 
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court found unreviewable 
discretion in Hanrahan v. Williams.40 Hanrahan sought review of the 
Illinois Prisoner Review Board's decision to deny him parole. The 
Board claimed that it had absolute discretion in parole decisions. The 
appellate court found sufficient standards to support review and noted 
that federal courts reviewed similar decisions in habeas corpus actions. 
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. It concluded that whereas the 
statute provides standards for denying parole the act did not "state when 
the Board must grant parole."41 Because the guidelines were not 
mandatory, the Board was not compelled to grant a parole and hence a 
designation); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410-1412 (lOth Cir.l990) (whether 
United States possesses federal reserve water rights under the wilderness act); Chiles v. U.S., 
69 F.3d 1094, 1096 (lith Cir. 1995); Clifford v. Pena, 77 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
37Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 111.2d 462, 120 Ill. Dec. 531, 
524 N.E.2d 561 (1988). 
38534 N.E.2d at 578. 
39524 N.E.2d at 578. 
40Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E. 2d 251, 254 (Ill. 1996), citing Greer v. Illinois 
Housing Dev. Auth., 524 N.E. 2d 561 (1988) (Citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,91 S.Ct. 814 (1971) and Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 
1649 (1985).). 
41673 N.E.2d at 255. 
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court has "no law to apply."42 Thus, it concluded that "the legislature, 
in drafting the statutory language, intended the Board to have complete 
discretion in determining whether to grant parole when the denial of 
parole is not mandated by statute."43 This conclusion, as discussed 
below, was bolstered by existing Illinois law precluding review of 
parole decisions. 
2. Decisions for which review standards are impossible 
A similar but fundamentally different case is presented by those 
discretionary decisions that seem by their nature impossible to review.44 
Because meaningful standard cannot be rendered for some decisions, 
there cannot be "law to apply" for the purposes of review. Thus, those 
decisions are made through the exercise of absolute decision making 
freedom but not because the legislature did not provide standards but 
because it cannot provide standards. By empowering the agency to 
make a decision of this nature, the legislature can be said to have 
intended that the agency have absolute discretion. 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Hanrahan was driven to its 
determination that parole decisions were unreviewable partly because 
it was confronted with decision making of this varietyY The Court 
noted: ''the highly subjective and predictive nature of the parole-release 
decision, along with the fact that there are no standards sufficiently 
objective to allow a court to evaluate the Board's decision ... , sets the 
42-Jbe Court also noted that the board's rules provided that paroles would be granted 
"as an exercise of grace and executive discretion." Agency rules, however, cannot be allowed 
to affect reviewability. That the rules assert absolute discretion cannot be used to conclude that 
the agency has such discretion. On the other hand, that the agency promulgates rules to guide 
the exercise of absolute discretion granted by statute cannot be used as standards for the 
purpose of establishing reviewability. Not only would such an approach distort the legislative 
will in allocating authority between the agency and the courts but it would create regrettable 
disincentives to the agency. 
43673 N.E.2d at 255. 
44Charles Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 G. W.L.Rev. 469, 
502 ( 1986). Dworkin calls this a strong sense of discretion. Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY, at 32 (1977). Jaffe, writing directly about administrative discretion, observed that 
a special discretion exists when an agency is to make an "intuitive leap" from relevant factors 
to a decision. Louis Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 556 ( 1965). 
45Hanrahan v. Williams, 673 N.E 2d 251 ,256-257 (Ill. 1996). 
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parole-release decisions apart from other cases."46 Decisions such as 
predictions can be judged correct only after the anticipated event and 
hence cannot be evaluated in the normal sense (although a court might 
monitor factors such as process and adequacy of the agency's 
consideration). A court can only substitute its prediction for that of the 
agency assigned that responsibility and to do so would be arrogating 
decision making authority granted to the agency. 
The reality of such decision making is difficult to accept. 
Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor, among others, has conceded that such 
discretion does exist in the administrative law system. She observed: 
"Some decisions, in short, may turn more on experience and intuition 
than on any listing of reasons, factors, standards, or the like. "47 Others 
have wrestled with the indisputable existence of "unknowable" 
elements in administrative decisions.48 Several observers have urged the 
benefits of such bureaucratic decision making. 49 Such a decision 
making process takes advantage of the agency as a decision making 
community to create a "decisional synergism."50 In reviewing this type 
of decision making, the important consideration is not the decision 
itself but the proper merging of administrative decision making 
elements. If a court attempts to do more, it would rob the process of its 
intended richness. 51 
46673 N.E. 2d at 257. 
47Sandra Day O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of Judicial Review in England 
and the United States, 27 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 643, 655 (1986). 
48See Richard Pierce, Sidney Shapiro, & Paul Verkuil, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS§ 7.3.4 (1985). 
49E.g., Jerry Mashaw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS, 75-75 (1983); Thomas McGarity, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE 
ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSISINTHEFEDERAL BUREAUCRACY, 179 (1991). 
50Stephen Breyer, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 112 ( 1982) ("The Environmental 
Protection Agency, for example, divided the problem of setting water pollution standards 
among several of its divisions; it staffed different divisions with people possessing different 
professional backgrounds (lawyers, business graduates, scientists); and it deliberately 
encouraged argument among them, in hope of giving top decision makers a more objective 
view."). See Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 1277, 1318 
(1984) ("Bureaucracy ... is not an impersonal machine but a social system, a way of mobilizing 
all aspects of human personality in order to transform individuals into a functioning group."). 
51 For further discussion see Charles Koch, Judicial Review of Administrative 
Discretion, 54 G.W.L.Rev. 469, 505-507 (1986). 
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E. Unreviewable Discretion Created by Operation of 
Law 
The absence of a statutory basis upon which to evaluate the 
agency decision is not the only test for unreviewable discretion. 52 
Complete administrative authority and decision making freedom is 
sometimes created by operation of law. For certain categories of 
administrative decisions, tradition or common law has ordained a 
system of unreviewable discretion. Similarly, constitutional principles 
might operate to deprive the judiciary of a role in certain types of 
administrative decisions. 
1. Review precluded by traditional law 
Traditional or common law has evolved unreviewability for the 
exercise of "prosecutorial" discretion. The Hanrahan opinion, relying 
on the federal authority discussed below, found that traditional 
understanding supported its finding ofunreviewability.53 As with this 
federal authority, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to apply the 
Overton Park "no law to apply" test. Yet, it was even more difficult 
than in the federal cases to claim that there were no standards. First, the 
appeals court found standards to apply and federal courts in similar 
cases had found standards. Several state courts had found standards 
although others had not. The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion lists 
several fairly explicit standards. In the end, the Illinois Court rejected 
the notion that these potential standards created "law to apply" because 
the standards were not mandatory. This conclusion is extremely 
unsatisfying. 
The Illinois Court, like the key U.S. Supreme Court opinions it 
applied, actually found that review of parole decisions was precluded 
by operation of Illinois law. 54 After noting the difference among the 
52Ronald Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 
Minn.L.Rev. 734 (1990) {"The Court could clarify its analysis by explicitly acknowledging 
what it is already doing implicitly: it should cease treating the 'law to apply' test as the 
exclusive standard for identifying actions that are 'committed to agency discretion.' "). 
53Hanrahan v. Willaims, 673 N.E.2d 251,256-257 (Ill. 1996). 
54673 N.W.2d at 255. 
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several states, the Court observed: "It is apparent that each state must 
decide, based on its own statutory scheme, whether the merits of parole-
release decisions are reviewable." In Illinois, the traditional law is that 
parole decisions are unreviewable as determined by its Supreme Court. 
The U.S. Supreme Court opinions it relied on similarly state the 
"no law to apply" test but ultimately decide on the basis of traditional 
law or common law. The U.S. Supreme Court's Heckler v. Chaney 
opinion, for example, looked to the tradition of unreviewable 
prosecutorial discretion. 55 Prison inmates brought actions to compel the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action 
against the use of lethal injections to carry out the death penalty, 
arguing that the drugs used were not approved by the FDA for human 
executions. The issue was whether the decision not to act against this 
drug use was committed to agency discretion in a way that precluded 
review. 56 The district court, the circuit court and the Supreme Court all 
began with the test for reviewability in Overton Park i.e. whether there 
was a meaningful standard by which to evaluate the agency's decision. 57 
Applying this test, the Court in Heckler found no controlling standard 
and hence held that the FDA's decision was unreviewable. 
However, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act includes 
standards that judges could apply.58 The real basis of the opinion was 
the well-established principle against review of prosecutorial-type 
discretion. This unreviewability, it found, has evolved into a 
well-established doctrine that was not changed by the APA.59 As 
55Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). 
56470 U.S. at 827, 105 S.Ct. at 1653. 
57Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 41o-413, 91 S.Ct. 
814,820-822,28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), on remand 1971 WL 2720 (W.D.Tenn.1971). 
58While it is true that, as Justice Rehnquist points out, nothing in the statute compels 
the Secretary to bring a case, the sections cited by the Court itself contain meaningful 
standards. The injunction section, 21 U.S.C.A. § 332, refers to a section listing "prohibited 
acts" (21 U.S.C.A. § 331 ), and the seizure section, 21 U.S.C.A. § 334, creates liability for 
"adulterated or misbranded" goods (as the Court recognized § 352 further defines misbranded). 
These are standards that courts regularly find meaningful and apply. In short, there was 
sufficient "law to apply" and hence a court would have the capacity to review in accordance 
with these standards but for the traditional acceptance of unbridled prosecutorial discretion. 
59470 U.S. at 831-832, 105 S.Ct. at 1655-1656. 
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Justice Rehnquist stated: "For good reasons, such a decision [whether 
to bring enforcement action or not] has traditionally been 'committed 
to agency discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting the 
AP A did not intend to alter that tradition.... (AP A did not significantly 
alter the 'common law' of judicial review of agency action). "60 Thus, 
the Court actually based its finding ofunreviewability on tradition and 
not on the absence of standards. 
Tradition as the basis for unreviewability was also the actual 
concept at work in the more recent Webster v. Doe opinion.61 The 
majority held that a CIA tennination decision was so committed to 
agency discretion as to preclude review, except for serious 
constitutional questions.62 Justice Scalia, dissenting, found 
constitutional questions precluded as well. He agreed with the assertion 
made above that the "no law to apply" test does not describe the full 
reach of the unreviewable discretion concept and he recognized that the 
"law" that precludes review may be common law.63 This common law, 
he observed, constitutes "a body of jurisprudence that had marked out, 
with more or less precision, certain issues and certain areas that were 
beyond the range of judicial review. "64 The personnel decision at issue 
in Webster, like prosecutorial decisions, were traditionally 
unreviewable. 
The Supreme Court in Lincoln v. Vigil found unreviewable a 
HHS's Indian Health Service decision to discontinue a program through 
which disabled Indian children received clinical services.65 It noted: 
"The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another 
administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to 
[unreviewable] agency discretion. "66 It reasoned that the same factors 
existed in such decisions as counciled against review in the type of 
60470 U.S. at 832, 105 S.Ct. at 1656 (emphasis added). 
61Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), on remand 
859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.l988). 
62486 U.S. at 601, 108 S.Ct. at 2053. 
63486 U.S. at 607, 108 S.Ct. at 2056 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
64486 U.S. at 607, 108 S.Ct. at 2056 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
65Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 113 S.Ct. 2024, 124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993). 
66508 U.S. at 192, 113 S.Ct. at 2031 (Emphasis added). 
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decisions confronted by the Heckler opinion.67 Thus, the 
unreviewability was justified by balancing a number of factors, 
including agency expertise, the statutory mandate, and advantages the 
agency has over the courts in making such decisions.68 Supervision of 
such decisions, it felt, is for Congress and not the courts.69 
2. Review precluded by constitutional principles 
In some cases, the law that creates the unreviewable discretion 
is based on constitutional interpretation. Such decisions differ from 
traditionally unreviewable discretion in that the "law" making the 
decision unreviewable has some constitutional force. 70 Often there is 
a very strong separation of powers argument that supports the 
conclusion that such decisions are entirely within the constitutional 
powers of the executive and the judicial branch is precluded from 
involving itself in them. 
Uniquely executive decisions would generally fall into this 
category. 71 A number of cases have upheld the strength of this doctrine. 
Some involve questions of foreign affairs.72 Others involve issues 
related to the military .73 General considerations of "national security" 
(1985). 
67Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 
68508 U.S. at 192, 113 S.Ct. at 2032. 
69508 U.S. at 193, 113 S.Ct. at 2032. 
70Jn our early constitutional history, there was no acceptance of absolute prosecutorial 
discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 844-849, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1663-1665, 84 
L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
71 Dina v. Attorney General of United States, 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir.1986). 
72Miranda v. Secretary ofTreasury, 766 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.l985) (upholding license 
denial by the secretary of state acting under the authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act); 
Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1428, 
47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1975) (upholding the dismissal of a taxpayer challenge to military and 
economic assistance to Israel); U.S. Information Agency v. Krc, 905 F.2d 389, 396 
(D.C.Cir.1990), on remand 1991 WL 166683 (D.D.C.1991) (Foreign Service personnel 
decisions); see Bagguley v. Bush, 953 F.2d 660, 662 (D.C.Cir.1991), cert. denied 503 U.S. 
995, 112 S.Ct. 1698, 118 L.Ed.2d 408 (1992) (The court relied on the Convention on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons.). 
73National Federation of Federal Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 406 
(D.C.Cir.1990) (base closing recommendations); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. 
Department of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 423 (2d Cir.1989) (Navy's failure to consider certain 
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might support unreviewability.74 Decisions involving "political 
questions" may involve the exercise of unreviewable discretion.75 
Unlike the common law sources of unreviewability, constitutionally 
based unreviewability is unassailable directly.76 
F. Summary 
There is a strong presumption in favor of review of 
administrative action and the law in both the federal and state systems 
precludes review in only three categories of cases. First, a statute may 
preclude review of either an entire category of administrative decisions 
or specific aspects of administrative decisions. Second, an 
administrative scheme may provide no basis on which to evaluate an 
agency's resolution, "no law to apply," and hence will imply such 
complete administrative authority and decisionmaking freedom, 
"discretion," that the courts have no basis on which to review. Third, 
the "operation of law," either judge-made common law or an 
interpretation of constitutional doctrine, may leave the courts no role. 
classified aspects in an environmental impact statement). 
74Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988), on remand 
859 F.2d 241 (D.C.Cir.l988); Doe v. Cheney, 885 F.2d 898,903-904 (D.C.Cir.l989). 
"Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). 
76Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 618-621, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2062-2063 (1998) (J. 
Scalia, dissenting, severely criticized the majority for failing to recognize the constitutional 
imperative for unreviewability in the case before them.). 
